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ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY TO SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF THE 
SELF-CARE PROVISION OF THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT TO THE 
STATES. 
The State of Utah argues that there is no legislative history sufficient in the debates 
regarding the self-care provision Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 2611 et seq. 
to presume that it confronts issues of gender discrimination or to support the decision by 
Congress to extend the Act to the States.1 Under the State's theory of the Act, the State 
has no immunity when Ms. Nicholas acts as a care-giver because that role is historically 
female. When she suffers illness as a result as a consequence of her care-giving, she is nol 
protected. The Congressional history of the FMLA does not support this conclusion. 
In support of its assertions regarding the lack of record tying the Act to issues of 
gender discrimination, the state cites a summary2 of the testimony relating to the act as 
evidence that the self-care provision was directed at protecting the sick, not preventing 
discrimination among them. In noting that the legislative history makes no reference to 
!In Appellant's Opening Brief, Nicholas cited Toeller v. Wisconsin Dept. OfCorr., 296 F. 
Supp. 2d 946 (E.D. Wis. 2003) for the proposition that the self-care provision of the FMLA was 
a proper exercise of Congressional authority. That decision has now been reversed by the 7th 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Toeller v. Wisconsin Dept. OfCorr., 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 21690 
(7th Cir. 2006/ 
2The summary attached to the Appellee's brief as Exhibit D does not constitute the 
legislative history of the Family Medical Leave Act as represented by the State ("The 
history includes on anecdote...." Appellee's Brief, page 18). The legislative history 
includes hundreds of pages of written testimony, hearings and debate by both houses of 
Congress. 
1 
either the States or issues of gender, the State points to a passage in the history 
referencing testimony by a woman with colon cancer. At the same time, however, the 
State ignores other sections of the text. Under "Leave for the Employee's Own Serious 
Illness," the report states: 
Indeed, it is hard to understand how single parents, who have no choice but 
to work to support their families, have survived under the present system. 
For this highly vulnerable group, whose numbers have exploded, a job 
guarantee for periods when they or their children have serious health 
conditions is urgently necessary. The high rates of single parenthood 
among minority families and of labor force participation by minority 
single mothers make job-guaranteed leaves especially critical for 
minorities. 
S. Rep. No. 103-3 (1993), emphasis added, attached to Appellee's Brief as Exhibit D. Not 
only does this language indicate a specific intention to protect women and minorities, 
both protected classes, it demonstrates the relationship between the family leave provision 
and the personal leave provision and supports the notion that the statute must be read as a 
whole, not broken into individual pieces. 
By focusing on that one report, the State neglects other record evidence, including 
the language of the act itself, that Congress saw evidence of discrimination against 
women in the dissemination of medical leave. "The bill will provide no incentive to 
discriminate against women, because it addresses the leave needs of workers who are 
young and old, male and female, married and single." H.R. Rep. No. 28, 101st Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1993). "This legislation is as much about giving women an equal economic 
2 
opportunity as it is about providing a national policy to protect jobs during times of family 
crisis." 139 Cong. Rec. 2262 (1993). 
Moreover, the Congressional Record contains a long history of evidence of gender 
discrimination by the States toward women in conditions of employment. That the history 
exists in the record outside the debates regarding the Family Medical Leave is not 
dispositive. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (noting that an 
examination of the legislative record is not necessary in all circumstances.) "After 
Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national concern, its Members gain 
experience that may reduce the need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when 
Congress again considers action in that area." Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 
(1980) (Powell, J., concurring). See also; Hibbs v. Dept. of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 
861 (9th Cir. 2001) ("when our nation's judicial history already documents 
unconstitutional discrimination against the class at issue, there is no need for Congress, 
separately and redundantly, to provide detailed findings of such discrimination in order to 
exercise its Fourteenth Amendment powers."). 
There is no question that the States have been complicit in the nation's long history 
of gender discrimination. As recently as 1973, the United States Supreme Court noted the 
impact of the culture's paternalistic attitude toward women. "As a result of notions such 
as these, our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions 
between the sexes . . . . Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or 
3 
bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal 
capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children." 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973). The Court went on to note that while 
the position of women had improved, there continued to be substantial, although at times 
more subtle, discrimination in arenas controlled by the states. Id. 
Moreover, Congress had a long record of legislative history relating to 
discrimination, including discrimination by the states, with regard to women's rights as 
employees including hearings arising out of the passage of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 
206(d)(1), Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. et. seq and the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k). In each of these cases, Congress found sufficient 
evidence to extend the reach of the law to the States. By the time Congress passed the 
pregnancy discrimination act in 1978, the Supreme Court had twice considered whether a 
failure to provide medical coverage for pregnancy constituted discrimination and in both 
case found that it did not. See; Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) and General 
Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Each of these decisions resulting in continued 
debate before Congress regarding discrimination against women in the workplace. 
Even after passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, there was debate over 
whether the act protected the pregnant spouses of male employees. Newport News 
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) ("It seems to me that analysis 
of this case should end here. Under our [previous decisions], petitioner's exclusion of 
4 
pregnancy benefits for male employees' spouses would not offend Title VII. Nothing in 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was intended to reach beyond female employees.") Id, 
at 693, (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Because the problem was not fully solved by the 
Act, Congress addressed the issue again in the Family Medical Leave Act, which in 
addition to the self-care provision which provides leave for women who become ill as a 
result of and after childbirth, also includes a provision for leave necessitated by the birth 
or adoption of a child. 
The case law dismissing claims by State employees based on 11th Amendment 
Immunity almost uniformly arises out of a decision to look at the Act in individual pieces. 
The result is the old adage of missing the forest for the trees. The language of the statute 
and the legislative history demonstrate an intention by Congress to move toward the goal 
of protecting both job and family stability, without sacrificing one for the other. The facts 
of this case support the notion that the Act only functions as intended when read together, 
as a whole. 
Lynn Nicholas took leave to help care for her son and grandchild after her 
daughter-in-law died during childbirth. This leave was not covered by the Act because the 
son was not a dependent. As time progressed, Ms. Nicholas took sporadic leave, both to 
help her son and to deal with her own depression. Finally, when her difficulty in dealing 
with sadness became overwhelming, she took personal medical leave. When the act is 
not read as a whole, the job security of an employee with a serious illness is nonexistent, 
5 
leaving the family without access to short term relief to protect itself from one of the most 
significant negative impacts resulting from the illness of one of its members. By 
providing leave, to be administered in a nondiscriminatory manner, the Act completes its 
intention of protecting the family and the workplace. 
Thus, the Family Medical Leave act in all of its provisions serves to fill the holes 
left by other measures intended to insure that sick leave is administered equitably. That 
purpose is consistent with Congressional power authorized by the 14th amendment and is 
not prohibited by 11th Amendment immunity.3 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing the Court should find that Congress was acting within its 
authority and that State of Utah cannot avoid complying with its promises pursuant to the 
FMLA by relying on its sovereign immunity. 
3
. The Utah Public Employees Association submitted an Amicus Curiae Brief to educate 
the Court that in some circuits employees retain the right to sue their individual supervisors or to 
request injunctive relief. The Brief does not address any of the issues raised in this case. 
Moreover, the brief does not acknowledge that the issue regarding the right to sue individual 
supervisors is the subject of a split among the circuits. Compare; Darby v. Bratch, 87 F. 3d 673 
(8th Cir. 2002) with Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 832 (6th Cir. 2003). Thus, there is not 
necessarily an alternate litigation strategy available to Nicholas. 
6 
Nicholas asks the Court to reverse the decision of the Court below and remand this 
matter for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ day of November 2006. 
7 
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